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How Do Need, Capacity, Geography, and Politics Influence Giving?

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In this chapter we seek to shed light on the question: “What are the types of factors that influence individual giving?” In recent years there has been a sustained effort, in and out of academia, to address this question. While we have learned a number of things, large areas have yet to be explored. For example, almost all work has been done on the impact on giving of individual factors, such as education, gender, race, income, and so on. While these are clearly relevant, it is important to remember that people are also embedded in larger contexts. So, while their personal income will definitely influence their level of giving, the wealth or poverty (measured by average income) of their city might also have a significant effect on how much they give overall and to certain causes.

Based on the aforementioned, it is our belief that in order to understand the totality of influences on individual giving, we need to include the impact of economic, political, and sociocultural environments, or macrofactors, as well as personal factors. It is also important for nonprofit managers, policymakers, and community leaders to be aware of the influence of these macrofactors. It may help to explain why people who have similar personal characteristics but who live in different contextual circumstances may have different levels of giving. What’s more, these larger factors change over time, either through planned efforts or for other reasons. Knowing what impacts on giving these factors have will make possible predictions of what these changes are likely to mean for giving levels.

Including macrofactors in social research, however, introduces a number of complications. In the first place, there are measurement errors at both the

micro- and macrolevels and combining these types of variables increases the chances of measurement error affecting the results. Second, the impact of the macrovariables is likely to be weaker than those of personal characteristics, as most people are most strongly influenced by the factors closest to them. More importantly, people are involved in nested, ever larger, systems. These range from family and/or friends, through a variety of informal and formal organizations, to large geographic units such as cities, states, and nations. Each of these may have independent impacts, and what's more, the impacts of higher level units may be through lower level units. For example, state expenditures on welfare may influence the level of poverty in a city, which in turn may lead some people to give more to the poor. Therefore, it is difficult and may be impossible to capture fully the effects of the macro variables.

In this research, we investigate the effect on giving of a variety of individual-level factors that have been included in past research studies. In addition, we include a number of economic, political, and socioeconomic factors, the effect on giving of which has not been previously examined, either singly or in conjunction with individual-level factors. It is clearly beyond the scope of this chapter to investigate these macroeffects at all possible levels.

Furthermore, lacking international, comparative data, the federal-level macrodata would not vary much if at all by households, so we cannot use that data to enhance our estimates. We have, consequently, chosen to measure them at the state level. While the sheer size of personal income and wealth at the national level as well as federal expenses and taxes may make national-level macrodata more important than state-level data for some effects, the lack of variation in federal data by household makes its inclusion impossible. For example, Deb, Wilhelm, Rooney, and Brown (2003) found that changes in wealth (as proxied by the S&P 500), personal income, giving in the prior year, and the top marginal tax bracket for households were key predictors of changes in personal giving by those itemizing deductions on their personal taxes.

Conversely, local-level macrodata may be important because of "propinquity effects," because individuals and families may be more affected by and may want to more strongly affect what transpires in their local communities. However, these data are not readily available for this analysis. Therefore, the state-level macrovariables may have the weakest effects, but it is the level at which data is most readily available.

We begin with a brief review of the existing literature on the determinants of giving behavior. From this literature we develop a set of hypotheses about

the role of macrofactors. We then introduce our data for analysis, and the results of the tests our hypotheses. After a discussion of these results, we offer suggestions for policymakers and nonprofit managers.

LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES

In their periodic surveys of giving and volunteering, INDEPENDENT SECTOR uses a variety of individual-level variables to help explain the level of giving. These include individual economic and financial considerations (tax bracket, level of economic comfort, etc.) as well as motivational factors (desire to help others, religious involvement, trust in people, etc.). These nationwide surveys provide the oldest and, currently, the most widely used information on individual giving in the United States. The Center on Philanthropy Panel Study (COPPS) is the most comprehensive and largest study of household giving ever completed ($n = 7,400$ with thousands of variables). Other recent nationwide studies of giving have been conducted by the United Way (United Way, 2003) and by Marshall Marketing and Communications (Lewis, 2003). None of these surveys considers the influence of larger (macro)factors—such as community conditions, culture, and government policy. There are reasons to believe that these factors may also play a part in determining the level of giving. Evidence for this can be derived from literature that has examined (1) the determinates of the number of nonprofits in communities (nonprofit presence), and (2) the interplay between government funding and philanthropy (crowding out).

We have an opportunity to examine the influence of macrofactors in conjunction with micro-level household data detailed in a nationwide dataset that has recently become available. The data come from a phone survey of a large ($n = 4,200$) cross-sectional, national sample collected in the fall 2001 by the Center on Philanthropy at Indiana University. Research participants completed one of five different surveys of varying lengths, all designed to assess household charitable giving.

The dataset contains basic demographic information for each individual, including: gender, race/ethnic, age, education, household income, and marital status. In addition, each individual will be assigned appropriate values on a variety of macro-level variables (described later) measured at the state level. These will include resources and needs, a United Way State of Caring Index, political culture, top marginal tax rate, and state government expenditures. These measures will be obtained from secondary sources such as the Census Bureau, *State and County Factbook*, and the like.

The literature on nonprofit presence is important since, as Wolpert (1993) and Bielefeld, Murdoch, and Waddell (1997) have shown, nonprofit organizations are largely locally supported. Therefore, factors which have been linked to the number of nonprofits in a community are likely to be factors that “work,” to a large degree, through influencing the level of giving in those communities. We should be able to measure the “giving” effect directly.

For example, most research assumes and has found that community needs and resources (such as income or poverty) will influence the number and distribution of nonprofit providers (Bielefeld, 2000). This leads to the expectation that resources such as community income or wealth will foster larger nonprofit sectors. We assess to what degree needs and resources influence philanthropy. In addition, given that nonprofits also provide services to middle- and upper-income patrons, it would be expected that wealthier communities will have a larger proportion of nonprofits providing services for them (such as education or arts), along with more giving for these types of organizations.

Community heterogeneity has also been found to influence the presence of nonprofits (Weisbrod, 1988). As an example, each of the income or minority ethnic groups in a diverse community might well desire a specialized version of some service, such as education. Government, with its mandate to serve the desires of a majority of the voters, will not fill this “heterogeneous demand” for education. The demand will, instead, be filled by private nonprofit organizations. This leads to the expectation that more economically or ethnically diverse communities will have more nonprofit organizations and higher giving to support them.

The influence of government spending on giving has been extensively studied and different effects have been found (for a review, see Steinberg, 2003). Some studies have found that government spending crowds out private giving, while others have found the opposite, or no effects. This is clearly a complex issue and more in-depth studies are needed. Our dataset will include both top marginal tax rates and direct government expenditures as measures to assess crowding out. We will be able to assess the crowding-out effect both independently of a wide variety of other variables—something few previous studies have done.

The political scientist Daniel Elazar (1984) has developed a typology of political culture that has been extensively used. His framework consists of three political cultures (moralistic, individualistic, and traditionalistic) that measure, among other factors, citizen attitudes about the proper role of government.

States have been classified on these three cultures (or combinations of them) and we use these classifications. Elazar's typology has been related to philanthropy and the makeup of nonprofit sectors (Bielefeld and Corbin, 1996; Schneider, 1996). Based on this work, it can be expected that communities with moralistic political cultures will have larger nonprofit sectors; those with individualistic political cultures should have smaller nonprofit sectors more oriented toward individual, entrepreneurial activities; and those with traditionalistic political cultures should have smaller nonprofit sectors providing traditional and conservative services. Giving should be consistent with these predictions.

Another political variable that could be considered is party affiliation. States with more Republicans would be expected to have more conservative populations, who would be less likely to donate to nonprofits providing welfare services. This would be expected to lead to less total (or proportionate) giving.

The effect of generosity has also been examined. In a series of studies, Julian Wolpert (see for example Wolpert, 1989) has examined levels of generosity in U.S. cities (as measured by giving to selected causes) and found that communities varied widely on this factor. We use a thirty-two-factor State of Caring Index computed for each state by the United Way (<http://national.united-way.org/stateofcaring/>) and expect a direct impact on giving.

Our analysis advances theory and research. We are able to measure the effect of each macro-level variable independent of both individual demographic variables and other macro-level variables. This should help untangle the effects of these variables and assess the degree to which individual and macro variables separately contribute to giving.

The discussion earlier can be summarized in the hypotheses below.

- H1: The higher the top marginal tax rate for a state, the higher the giving levels because the lower the cost of after-tax giving will be.
- H2: The higher the poverty rate, the lower the giving because while the poor give a higher share (%) of their income, they give a lower percentage of total giving.
- H3: The higher the income gap between the top and bottom 5th, the higher the giving, because (1) differences between rich and poor are greater and people will respond, and (2) economic diversity will be greater.
- H4: The greater the per capita income, the greater the giving because income is strongly associated with giving.

- H5: The higher the state expenditures, or expenditures on health (H6), education (H7), or social services (H8), the lower giving levels will be, because government spending tends to crowd out private giving.
- H9: The greater the Republican dominance in state legislature, the less the giving, because conservative values are opposed to public or private welfare.
- H10: In a moralistic political culture giving will be greater, due to a greater concern for public and private redistribution of income and subsequent giving to welfare causes.
- H11: In an individualistic political culture, giving will be less, due to a greater reliance on the market and for-profits to deal with social issues.
- H12: In a traditionalistic political culture giving will be less, due to giving to a more limited number of causes (those favoring the status quo).
- H13: The greater the number of active charities, the greater the giving, because there are more organizations likely to ask more people and asking is associated with giving.
- H14: The higher the United Way State of Caring Index, the greater the giving due to greater concern for the poor.

FINDINGS

As noted earlier, in the study research participants completed one of five different surveys (modules) of varying formats and lengths, all designed to assess household charitable giving. The goal of that research was to measure the effect of the various ways of asking about giving that have been used in previous research. (See Rooney, Steinberg, and Schervish [forthcoming] for a detailed discussion of these results and the methodological issues addressed, Rooney, Chin, Mesch, and Steinberg [forthcoming] for an analysis of differences in giving by race and gender using the same dataset, as well as Steinberg and Rooney [forthcoming] for an examination of giving following 9/11.) For the purposes of this analysis, we have combined the results of these various surveys, and four dummy variables (PSID Module, etc.) are included in the analysis to control for the effects of the respondent taking a particular module.

The analysis computed probit and tobit regression equations for a base model and then added the various groups of contextual variables to that model. Probit indicates the change in the probability of a person donating at all for a one-unit change in the independent variable. Tobit indicates the change in the amount given for a one-unit change in the independent variable. Its results can be read

like those of OLS. The difference between tobit and OLS is that tobit adjusts for a truncated dependent variable—in our case the fact that giving cannot be negative and that there may be many zeros (nondonors). To simplify the text, we have these results in an appendix but have used summary tables in the text.

The first step in the analysis, however, was an assessment of the reasonableness of using a state level of analysis. Table 7.1 shows basic descriptive data for the variables in the analysis. These descriptive statistics seem reasonable and are comparable to other studies. We began our analysis with the base model variables using dummies for state and region, which were included. In terms of both probit and tobit results, a few state or regional effects were found (see tables A1 and A2 in the appendix for detailed results).

INTERPRETATION

Table 7.2 summarizes the directions (positive or negative) of all variable coefficients from Table A3 through Table A8 in the appendix that meet the significance criteria considered ($p < .15$, etc.). (Notes: P = Probit and T = Tobit. The sign and significance of the “base” variables are only indicated in the “base” columns—even though they are included in each of the “context” regressions. With only a few exceptions, the significance levels of these “base” variables remain the same across all models and the signs do not change.)

From these significant effects we can draw a number of conclusions regarding the pattern of effects found in the base model as well as the effects of the various groups of contextual variables.

A number of *base model* variables have consistently positive or negative effects across total, religious, and nonreligious giving. Age, income, and religion have consistently positive effects. Less education and minority status have consistently negative effects. Gender and marital status have mixed effects. Gender has a positive effect in that women have a higher probability of making a donation of any sort and both making a nonreligious donation and the amount of that donation. On the other hand, women give a smaller donation to religious causes. Being married leads only to a higher probability of making a nonreligious donation. Religiosity is a positive predictor not only of religious giving (not a surprise at all) and total giving (not a surprise since religious giving tends to be a big part of total giving) but also nonreligious giving (which was somewhat surprising and may be suggestive of future research). Table 7.3 summarizes these results relative to their respective hypotheses.

Table 7.1. Variables in the Analysis

Variable	Mean	Std D	Description
Amount given	1490.84	3625.84	Overall (total) amount given
Amt: religion	1230.18	20532.72	Amount given to religion
Amt: non-religion	2703.50	81730.00	Amount given to non-religion
<i>Base Model</i>			
Age	44.2	15.2	Respondent age
Female	.58	.49	Dummy—female respondent
Married	.58	.49	Dummy—married respondent
Income	3.17	1.70	Income in seven categories
High school or less	.29	.45	Dummy—high school or less education
Minority	.20	.40	Dummy—non-white
Religion	.44	.50	Dummy—religious
PSID module	.19	.39	Dummy—PSID survey module
Area module	.21	.41	Dummy—area survey module
Method Module	.19	.39	Dummy—Method survey module
MA Module	.20	.40	Dummy—MA survey module
Short Module	.21	.41	Dummy—Very short survey module
<i>Economic Conditions</i>			
Top tax rate	5.5	2.9	Top state tax rate
Poverty	11.5	2.8	State poverty rate
Income gap	10.0	1.5	Income gap between top and bottom 5th
Income per cap	42596	5318	State income per capita

<i>State Spending</i>			
State total exp	.005	.001	Per capita state total expenditures
State health exp	.0004	.0002	Per capita state expenditures on health
State human exp	.0006	.0002	Per capita state expenditures on human services
State ed exp	.001	.0002	Per capita state expenditures on education
<i>Political Conditions</i>			
% Rep in House	.53	.21	Percent of state house seats republican
% Rep in Senate	.48	.44	Percent of state senate seats republican
M	.14	.35	Dummy—moralistic political culture
MI	.03	.18	Dummy—moralistic/individualistic culture
IM	.19	.39	Dummy—individualistic/moralistic culture
I	.12	.33	Dummy—individualistic political culture
IT	.03	.17	Dummy—individualistic/traditionalistic culture
TI	.21	.41	Dummy—traditionalistic/individualistic culture
T	.08	.27	Dummy—traditionalistic political culture
TM	.04	.20	Dummy—traditionalistic/moralistic culture
<i>Social/Sector</i>			
Active NPOs	27822	23240	Number of active nonprofit organizations
UW Caring Index	533.6	64.5	United Way Index of Caring

Table 7.2. Summary of Direction of Significant Coefficients—Variable Groups Entered Separately

	<i>Overall Giving</i>				<i>Religious</i>				<i>Non-Religious</i>			
	<i>Base</i>		<i>Context</i>		<i>Base</i>		<i>Context</i>		<i>Base</i>		<i>Context</i>	
	<i>P</i>	<i>T</i>	<i>P</i>	<i>T</i>	<i>P</i>	<i>T</i>	<i>P</i>	<i>T</i>	<i>P</i>	<i>T</i>	<i>P</i>	<i>T</i>
Age	+	+			+	+			+	+		
Female	+					-			+	+		
Married									+			
Income	+	+			+	+			+	+		
High school or less	-	-			-	-			-	-		
Minority	-	-			-	-			-	-		
Religion	+	+			+	+			+	+		
Top Tax Rate												
Poverty			-			-	+				-	
Income gap			+				-				+	
Income per cap			-				+					
State Total Exp		+								-		
State health exp											-	
State human exp												
State ed exp												
% Rep in House												
% Rep in Senate			-									
M				+				+				
MI				-								
IM							+					
I				-							-	-
IT												
TI												
T												
Active NPOs												
Caring Index			+				+			+		

Economic contextual variables have mixed effects.

- H1 is not supported. Top tax rate has no effects.
- H2 is partially supported. Poverty leads to a lower probability of making an overall, religious, on nonreligious donation. On the other hand, it leads to giving a higher amount to religion. This corroborates the notion that much of the giving by the poor is to religious organizations.
- H3 is partially supported. The income gap leads to a higher probability in making any donation and making a nonreligious donation. On the other hand, it leads to giving a smaller amount to religious causes.

Table 7.3. Summary of Hypothesis Tests—Variable Groups Entered Separately

<i>Hypothesis</i>	<i>Support</i>	<i>Description</i>
H1	None	Higher tax rate—higher giving
H2	Partial	Higher poverty—lower giving Found: lower probabilities—higher religious amount
H3	Partial	Higher income gap—higher giving Found: higher prob overall/non-religious—lower religious amt
H4	Partial	Higher per capita income—higher giving Found: higher religious amount - lower prob. overall
H5	Partial	Higher total state spending—lower giving Found: lower prob. non-religious—higher prob. overall
H6	Partial	Higher state health spending—lower giving Found: lower prob. non-religious
H7	None	Higher state education spending—lower giving
H8	None	Higher state social service spending—lower giving
H9	Partial	Higher Republican dominance—lower giving Found: lower prob. overall (state senate only)
H10	Yes	Moralistic political culture—higher giving Found: higher amount overall and religious (pure type only)
H11	Yes	Individualistic political culture—lower giving Found: lower overall & non-religious (pure type only)
H12	None	Traditionalistic political culture—lower giving
H13	None	Number of active charities—higher giving
H14	Yes	United Way State of Caring Index —higher giving Found: higher prob. overall, religious, non-religious

- H4 is partially supported. Income per capita leads both to a lower probability of making any donation and giving more to religious causes.

State expenditure variables have only a few effects.

- H5 to H8 (crowding out) are partially supported. Per capita total state expenditures lead to a higher probability of making any donation and a lower probability of making a donation to nonreligious causes. Per capita state expenditures on health lead to a lower probability of donating to nonreligious causes.

For the *political* variables, a number of effects are found.

- H9 is supported in one finding. The percent of Republicans in the senate leads to a lower probability of making a donation of any sort.
- H10 though H11 are supported in the pure cultures. A moralistic culture leads to higher donations overall and higher donations to religious causes (H10). On the other hand, an individualistic culture leads to a lower degree of giving to any causes and lower giving to nonreligious causes (H11). In addition, though, a mixed moralistic/individualistic culture has mixed effects, leading

to less giving overall and a higher probability of giving to religious causes. H12 (traditionalistic culture) is not supported.

For the *social* variables, support is found for one hypothesis.

- H13 is not supported. The number of active charities does not effect any of the aspects of giving considered.
- H14 is supported. The caring index has a positive effect on the probability of any giving and the probability of giving to both religious and nonreligious causes.

As shown in detail in Table A10 and summarized in Table 7.4, when all contextual variables are included in the analysis, a number of the significant effects noted earlier drop out and several new ones appear. Effects from earlier drop-

Table 7.4. Summary of Direction of Significant Effects—All Variables in Model

	<i>Overall Giving</i>		<i>Religious</i>		<i>Non-Religious</i>	
	<i>P</i>	<i>T</i>	<i>P</i>	<i>T</i>	<i>P</i>	<i>T</i>
Age	+	+	+	+	+	+
Female	+			-	+	+
Married					+	
Income	+	+	+	+	+	+
High school or less	-	-	-	-	-	-
Minority	-	-	-	-	-	-
Religion	+	+	+	+	+	+
Top Tax Rate						
Poverty						
Income gap	+			-	+	
Income per cap	-					
State Total Exp						
State health exp						
State human exp	-					
State ed exp						
% Rep in House						
% Rep in Senate						
M	+	+			+	
MI	-	-			-	
IM						
I						
IT						
TI						
T					+	
Active NPOs				+		
Caring Index			+			

Table 7.5. Summary of Hypothesis Tests—All Variables in Model

<i>Hypothesis</i>	<i>Support</i>	<i>Description</i>
H1	None	Higher tax rate—higher giving
H2	None	Higher poverty—lower giving
H3	Partial	Higher income gap—higher giving
H4	Opposite	Higher per capita income—higher giving Found: higher prob overall/non-religious—lower religious amt Found: lower prob. overall
H5	None	Higher total state spending—lower giving
H6	None	Higher state health spending—lower giving
H7	None	Higher state education spending—lower giving
H8	Partial	Higher state social service spending—lower giving Found: lower prob of overall
H9	None	Higher Republican dominance—lower giving
H10	Partial	Moralistic political culture—higher giving Found: higher prob and amt overall & prob religious (pure type only)
H11	Partial	Individualistic political culture—lower giving Found: lower prob and amt overall and prob non-religious (MI type only)
H12	Opposite	Traditionalistic political culture—lower giving Found: higher prob of non-religious (pure type only)
H13	Partial	Number of active charities—higher giving Found: higher amount for religious
H14	Partial	United Way State of Caring Index—higher giving Found: higher prob. for religious

ping out (and hypotheses losing support) include: poverty, total state expenditures, Republican presence in state legislature. In addition, negative support is found for several hypotheses, including per capita income and traditionalistic political culture. Finally, however, support for a number of hypotheses remains or appears. This includes the effects of the income gap, crowding out due to human services expenditures, the moralistic political culture (and somewhat for the individualistic political culture in a mixed type), and (for religious giving) the number of active charities and the UW Caring Index. Table 7.5 summarizes these results with respect to the various hypotheses.

CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS

Our findings have a number of implications for nonprofit managers and community leaders. In general, they verify our expectation that both individual-level variables and macro-level economic, political, and sociocultural contextual variables have an impact on individual giving. The individual-level variables in our analysis have been examined in previous studies. Most of them had strong impacts on giving. In this research they were included in the same analysis, so the effects of any one can be examined independent of the

others. These results, in conjunction with the demographics of particular communities or organizational donors can help leaders both understand particular giving levels and design programs to increase giving.

At the macro, contextual level, we examined a variety of variables, which have not been systematically examined previously. These were examined for total giving as well as separately for religious and nonreligious giving. In this analysis we have provided new information to leaders. In summary, we find that state-level poverty rate, income gap, public expenditures, political culture, and generosity levels had impacts on giving.

These results can be used to understand how larger environments might influence giving levels and the reasons for changes in giving levels both in particular communities and in particular nonprofit organizations. For example, increases in the poverty rate may partially explain decreases in individual giving, while increases in the income gap, and state expenditures may partially account for increases. Those seeking to explain differences in giving between communities may also look to these variables.

Over and above this, the results can inform efforts by nonprofits and community leaders to influence levels of giving. Nonprofits can take the results into account in structuring appeals and community leaders could use them to inform state or community change efforts. For example, community leaders can seek to increase state expenditures, noting that this is likely to also result in higher levels of giving. In terms of political culture, giving is higher in moralistic cultures. Nonprofits, therefore could seek to solicit gifts in areas where this culture is prevalent. In addition, efforts can be made to promote the values this culture is based on, namely that the redistribution of resources can have positive impacts on community welfare.

We find our results encouraging, especially given that the contextual variables were measured at the state level, where their effects were likely to be weaker than at lower-level regional or metropolitan levels because of “propinquity effects,” and less than the federal level variables because of their sheer “scale effects.” It is possible that some of the variables that were not significant at the state level may, in fact, be significant statistically or empirically important at more local or federal levels. Nonprofit and community leaders should seek to assess these factors at the levels most important to them, and for many this is likely to be the metropolitan or rural community level. We expect that the knowledge they accumulate will help them address important community issues.

APPENDIX

Table A1. Probit—Probability of Giving: Base Model (with State and Region Dummies)

	<i>w/ State Dummies</i>		<i>w/ Region Dummies</i>	
	<i>Coeff</i>	<i>Sig</i>	<i>Coeff</i>	<i>Sig</i>
Constant	1.0886		.0121	
Age	.0007	++	.0007	++
Female	.0435	**	.0417	**
Married	.0071		.0089	
Income	.0352	**	.0351	**
High school or less	-.0786	**	-.0795	**
Minority	-.0577	**	-.0531	**
Religion	.0927	**	.0926	**
PSID module	-.0228		-.0270	++
Area module	-.0224		-.0217	
Method module	.1669	**	.1641	**
MA module	.2190	**	.2162	**
State dummies (None are significant)			—	—
Region 7	—	—	-.0366	+
Adjusted R squared	.166		.151	

+ = $p < .15$ ++ = $p < .10$
 * = $p < .05$ ** = $p < .01$

Table A2. Tobit—Total Amount Given: Base Model (with State and Region Dummies)

	<i>w/ State Dummies</i>		<i>w/ Region Dummies</i>	
	<i>Coeff</i>	<i>Sig</i>	<i>Coeff</i>	<i>Sig</i>
Constant	-2111.8	+	-3354.8	**
Age	25.2	**	25.6	**
Female	-131.3		-122.6	
Married	-55.0		-67.5	
Income	728.1	**	733.0	**
High school or less	-680.9	**	-698.6	**
Minority	-518.1	**	-503.3	**
Religion	1799.3	**	1830.6	**
PSID module	302.4	+	285.0	
Area module	254.6		260.6	
Method module	664.8	**	641.3	**
MA module	1711.3	**	1713.4	**
SIGMA	3614.2	**	3643.0	**
MD	-2423.0	++	—	—
WV	-2040.8	+	—	—
Region 8	—	—	472.7	+
Log likelihood	-27555		-27578	

+ = $p < .15$ ++ = $p < .10$
 * = $p < .05$ ** = $p < .01$

Table A3. Probit—Probability of Giving: Base Model and Contextual Variable Clusters

	Base		Economic		State Expend.		Political		Social	
	Coeff	Sig	Coeff	Sig	Coeff	Sig	Coeff	Sig	Coeff	Sig
Constant	.0068		.1540	+	-.0521		-.0025		-.0793	
Age	.0007	++	.0007	++	.0007	++	.0007	++	.0007	++
Female	.0413	**	.0412	**	.0413	**	.0420	**	.0418	**
Married	.0082		.0097		.0093		.0101		.0085	
Income	.0356	**	.0351	**	.0349	**	.0353	**	.0355	**
High school or less	-.0793	**	-.0807	**	-.0779	**	-.0792	**	-.0795	**
Minority	-.0531	**	-.0524	**	-.0573	**	-.0511	**	-.0500	**
Religion	.0891	**	.0911	**	.0916	**	.0904	**	.0902	**
PSID module	-.0282	++	-.0251	+	-.0276	++	-.0257	+	-.0264	+
Area module	-.0222		-.0207		-.0217		-.0209		-.0217	
Method module	.1621	**	.1658	**	.1630	**	.1656	**	.1642	**
MA module	.2156	**	.2179	**	.2168	**	.2172	**	.2180	**
Top tax rate			.0002							
Poverty			-.0118	**						
Income gap			.0154	**						
Income per cap			-.0000	*						

State total exp		27.345	*						
State health exp		-10.781							
State human exp		-72.019							
State ed exp		-15.472							
% Rep in House				.0175					
% Rep in Senate				-.0091	*				
M				.0306					
MI				-.0913					
IM				.0172					
I				-.0076					
IT				-.0230					
TI				-.0082					
T				-.0033					
Active NPOs								.0000	+
Caring Index								.0002	
Adj R Square		.149		.152		.151		.150	

+ = p < .15 ++ = p < .10
 * = p < .05 ** = p < .01

Table A4. Tobit—Total Amount Given: Base Model and Contextual Variable Clusters

	Base		Economic		State Expend.		Political		Social	
	Coeff	Sig	Coeff	Sig	Coeff	Sig	Coeff	Sig	Coeff	Sig
Constant	-3180	**	-3727	**	-3397	**	-3497	**	-3492	**
Age	25.1	**	25.6	**	25.6	**	25.6	**	25.5	**
Female	-128.9	**	-127.2	**	-123.5	**	-135.7	**	-125.7	**
Married	-49.0	**	-60.8	**	-57.3	**	-61.6	**	-53.7	**
Income	727.9	**	732.0	**	729.6	**	727.3	**	728.0	**
High school or less	-685.4	**	-718.9	**	-710.9	**	-733.7	**	-720.8	**
Minority	-525.8	**	-505.1	**	-529.8	**	-471.7	**	-517.3	**
Religion	1794.0	**	1809.4	**	1817.0	**	1825.5	**	1824.2	**
PSID module	300.3	+	292.6	+	302.6	+	310.4	+	303.6	+
Area module	251.6	**	267.3	**	268.5	**	239.2	**	266.0	**
Method module	659.4	**	638.5	**	641.2	**	643.4	**	646.6	**
MA module	1716.7	**	1718.1	**	1721.2	**	1715.5	**	1729.8	**
SIGMA	3616.2	**	3645.0	**	3647.0	**	3630.2	**	3647.9	**
Top tax rate			29.9							
Poverty			43.0							
Income gap			-83.5							
Income per cap			.01							

Table A5. Probit—Probability of Giving to Religion: Base Model and Contextual Variable Clusters

	Base		Economic		State Expend.		Political		Social	
	Coeff	Sig	Coeff	Sig	Coeff	Sig	Coeff	Sig	Coeff	Sig
Constant	-.2714	**	-.0534	**	-.3180	**	-.2942	**	-.5658	**
Age	.0021	**	.0021	**	.0021	**	.0021	**	.0020	**
Female	.0047		.0031		.0051		.0035		.0026	
Married	.0189		.0181		.0209		.0210		.0176	
Income	.0352	**	.0350	**	.0347	**	.0346	**	.0346	**
High school or less	-.0400	++	-.0412	++	-.0434	++	-.0427	++	-.0421	++
Minority	-.0663	**	-.0575	*	-.0629	**	-.0591	*	-.0541	*
Religion	.4129	**	.4157	**	.4118	**	.4147	**	.4167	**
PSID module	-.1276	**	-.1283	**	-.0276	**	-.1292	**	-.1268	**
Area module	-.1269	**	-.1308	**	-.1279	**	-.1294	**	-.1312	**
Top tax rate			-.0015							
Poverty			-.0148	*						
Income gap			.0080							
Income per cap			-.0000							

State total exp									
State health exp	-19.36								
State human exp	44.56								
State ed exp	123.16								
	29.46								
% Rep in House		.0274							
% Rep in Senate		-.0097							
M		.0275							
MI		-.0166							
IM		.0544	++						
I		.0296							
IT		.0301							
TI		-.0167							
T		.0020							
Active NPOs								.0000	**
Caring Index								.0005	**
Adj R Square		.285	.289	.287	.289			.292	

+ = p < .15 ++ = p < .10
 * = p < .05 ** = p < .01

Table A6. Probit—Probability of Giving to Non-Religious: Base Model and Contextual Variable Clusters

	Base		Economic		State Expend.		Political		Social	
	Coeff	Sig	Coeff	Sig	Coeff	Sig	Coeff	Sig	Coeff	Sig
Constant	.2282	**	.2080	+	.1926	**	.2308	**	.2187	**
Age	.0013	*	.0013	*	.0013	*	.0013	*	.0013	*
Female	.0672	**	.0664	**	.0668	**	.0661	**	.0676	**
Married	.0233	+	.0285	+	.0264	+	.0266	+	.0258	+
Income	.0425	**	.0407	**	.0411	**	.0418	**	.0416	**
High school or less	-.1064	**	-.1074	**	-.1049	**	-.1088	**	-.1058	**
Minority	-.0550	**	-.0628	**	-.0609	**	-.0567	**	-.0617	**
Religion	.0397	*	.0428	**	.0458	**	.0413	*	.0417	*
PSID module	-.2918	**	-.2894	**	-.2926	**	-.2902	**	-.2923	**
Area module	-.3402	**	-.3411	*	-.3419	**	-.3391	**	-.3414	**
Top tax rate			-.0024							
Poverty			-.0104	++						
Income gap			.0279	**						
Income per cap			-.0000							

Table A7. Tobit—Total Amount Given to Religion: Base Model and Contextual Variable Clusters

	Base		Economic		State Expend.		Political		Social	
	Coeff	Sig	Coeff	Sig	Coeff	Sig	Coeff	Sig	Coeff	Sig
Constant	-4662	**	-6182	**	-4426	**	-4947	**	-5463	**
Age	25.0	**	24.6	**	25.3	**	24.6	**	24.7	**
Female	-298.2	+	-316.9	++	-291.2	++	-291.0	+	-299.9	+
Married	196.7		178.7		183.5		175.5		196.6	
Income	513.2	**	513.6	**	519.5	**	528.3	**	510.8	**
High school or less	-327.7	+	-320.6	+	-322.1	+	-300.6	+	-333.2	+
Minority	-490.0	*	-478.4	++	-484.3	*	-443.9	++	-467.6	++
Religion	3868.4	**	3851.5	**	3828.2	**	3846.5	**	3881.9	**
PSID module	-966.7	**	-972.8	**	-965.8	**	-942.7	**	-964.1	**
Area module	-737.1	**	-744.7	**	-728.1	**	-719.1	**	-750.9	**
SIGMA	3509.4	**	3493.9	**	3504.2	**	3501.8	**	3510.7	**
Top tax rate			19.6							
Poverty			106.7	+						
Income gap			-224.9	**						
Income per cap			.06	++						

State total exp					
State health exp	-111708				
State human exp	552441				
State ed exp	-376430				
	232945				
% Rep in House		334.3			
% Rep in Senate		102.8			
M		516.9	+		
MI		-807.4			
IM		-53.7			
I		-195.5			
IT		664.7			
TI		-122.3			
T		144.6			
Active NPOs				.0014	
Caring Index				1.435	
Log likelihood			-9964		-10005
				-10001	
				-10006	

+ = p < .15 ++ = p < .10
 * = p < .05 ** = p < .01

Table A8. Tobit—Total Amount Given to Non-Religion: Base Model and Contextual Variable Clusters

	Base		Economic		State Expend.		Political		Social	
	Coeff	Sig	Coeff	Sig	Coeff	Sig	Coeff	Sig	Coeff	Sig
Constant	-1391.5	**	-1408.6	**	-1375.5	*	-1186.5	**	-1029.3	+
Age	16.4	**	16.5	**	16.4	**	15.8	**	15.3	**
Female	233.0	++	242.7	++	232.1	++	240.6	+	235.9	++
Married	-49.5	**	-42.4	**	-42.4	**	-23.7	**	-32.4	**
Income	579.0	**	580.7	**	576.5	**	556.3	**	575.7	**
High school or less	-567.6	**	-570.2	**	-571.8	**	-630.5	**	-562.7	**
Minority	-252.4	**	-270.1	+	-258.6	+	-22.1	+	-295.4	+
Religion	425.0	**	413.7	**	425.5	**	442.5	**	426.4	**
PSID module	-1205.1	**	-1202.8	**	-1200.8	**	-1187.7	**	-1210.7	**
Area module	-1517.1	**	-1505.2	**	-1515.7	**	-1524.2	**	-1515.4	**
SIGMA	2875.9	**	2875.5	**	2876.4	**	2836.5	**	2876.0	**
Top tax rate			6.6							
Poverty			15.5							
Income gap			12.6							
Income per cap			-.008							

State total exp	20457				
State health exp	23346				
State human exp	70479				
State ed exp	-120715				
% Rep in House		76.3			
% Rep in Senate		-54.2			
M		-215.4			
MI		-267.9			
IM		-6.0			
I		-369.7	+		
IT		-299.5			
TI		-142.6			
T		-170.8			
Active NPOs				.0024	
Caring Index				-.7811	
Log likelihood					-14735
					-14736
					-14647
					-14735

+ = p < .15
 ** = p < .01

Table A9. Probit—Probability of Giving: Base Model and Contextual Variables

	<i>Total</i>		<i>Religious</i>		<i>Non-Religious</i>	
	<i>Coeff</i>	<i>Sig</i>	<i>Coeff</i>	<i>Sig</i>	<i>Coeff</i>	<i>Sig</i>
Constant	-.1258		-.6856	+	.2901	
Age	.0007	++	.0020	**	.0012	*
Female	.0419	**	.0032		.0664	**
Married	.0097		.0190		.0297	+
Income	.0350	**	.0349	**	.0409	**
High school or less	-.0788	**	-.0450	*	-.1045	**
Minority	-.0529	**	-.0515	*	-.0645	**
Religion	.0912	**	.4143	**	.0455	**
PSID module	-.0238	+	-.1258	**	-.2882	**
Area module	-.0200		-.1312	**	-.3392	**
Method module	.1669	**				
MA module	.2178	**				
Top tax rate	-.0011		-.0064		-.0042	
Poverty	-.0057		.0076		-.0142	
Income gap	.0219	**	.0022		.0325	**
Income per cap	-.0000	+	-.0000		-.0000	
State total exp	24.740		-27.888		25.006	
State health exp	7.085		53.211		-80.204	
State human exp	-168.965	*	22.109		-72.431	
State ed exp	-10.752		-9.737		-18.319	
% Rep in House	.0098		.0308		.0612	
% Rep in Senate	-.0080		-.0326		-.0112	
M	.0476	+	-.0233		.0707	+
MI	-.0897	**	-.0057		-.1044	++
IM	.0142		.0237		.0052	
I	.0112		-.0002		-.0306	
IT	.0059		.0141		.0227	
TI	-.0044		-.0343		-.0036	
T	.0117		-.0133		.0626	+
Active NPOs	.0000		.0000		.0000	
Caring Index	.0003		.0009	++	-.0001	
Adj R Square	.156		.294		.212	

+ = p < .15 ++ = p < .10
 * = p < .05 ** = p < .01

Table A10. Tobit—Total Amount Given: Base Model and Contextual Variables

	<i>Total</i>		<i>Religious</i>		<i>Non-Religious</i>	
	<i>Coeff</i>	<i>Sig</i>	<i>Coeff</i>	<i>Sig</i>	<i>Coeff</i>	<i>Sig</i>
Constant	-1447.2		-3560.7		963.5	
Age	25.5	**	24.2	**	15.6	**
Female	-136.0		-301.8	+	-214.2	+
Married	-57.0		183.0		-9.9	
Income	727.3	**	517.8	**	555.6	**
High school or less	-723.0	**	-320.3	+	-634.3	**
Minority	-493.7	**	-475.4	*	-287.2	+
Religion	1819.2	**	3833.0	**	438.2	**
PSID module	297.5	+	-953.5	**	-1184.5	**
Area module	233.1		-743.8	**	-1520.8	**
Method module	631.0	**				
MA module	1707.4	**				
SIGMA	3626.6	**	3489.1	**	2833.0	**
Top tax rate	11.4		6.9		-23.8	
Poverty	-17.5		4.0		-14.2	
Income gap	-104.1		-272.5	*	-60.9	
Income per cap	-.02		.03		-.02	
State total exp	135635		-157858		-52190	
State health exp	90120		450167		179625	
State human exp	-315489		566703		447575	
State ed exp	-36530		632623		49465	
% Rep in House	183.4		41.8		156.4	
% Rep in Senate	273.9		184.6		-22.7	
M	570.3	++	273.0		-45.9	
MI	-774.5	+	-851.4		-400.7	
IM	205.9		119.3		62.7	
I	-292.5		-403.7		-375.4	
IT	385.7		485.2		-132.6	
TI	-52.8		203.1		-287.4	
T	-49.0		248.1		199.9	
Active NPOs	.007		.012	+	.006	
Caring Index	-1.8		-1.4		-1.7	
Adj R Square	-27566		-9959		-14645	

+ = p < .15 ++ = p < .10
* = p < .05 ** = p < .01

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