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## **Parental Influence on Charitable Giving**

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Abstract:

In this paper we consider the impact of parental behavior and family structure on the philanthropic giving and volunteering of their children when they become adults and form separate households. Ignoring parental influence, we are able to explain about 35% of the variation in household charitable giving based on the characteristics of the immediate family, leaving 65% of that variation unaccounted for (Hughes and Luksetich, 2004). By including the generosity of parents, their religious commitment, and the stability of the family we will measure the impact of parental values on their adult children's behavior. We expect that those families that are more generous than their peers will transmit this generosity to their children. The strength of this influence is assumed to be greater in stable families and weakened in families with divorce or separation.

### Introduction

The interest in building community and increasing public welfare has recently focused on the idea of social capital. Social capital is thought to benefit communities through better local government, greater civic participation, lower crime rates, increased well being, and better health (John and Morris, 2003). How social capital is created and transmitted across generations is relatively uncertain. Social values and civic engagement are likely influenced by family values, socioeconomic status, educational institutions, religious associations, culture, maturity, and pivotal events in history.

In this paper we focus on one aspect of social involvement, that of charitable giving. We consider the impact of parental behavior on the philanthropic giving of their children. Using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics and the Center on Philanthropic Panel Study we estimate the determinants of charitable giving, including both the socioeconomic factors of the children and the socioeconomic and philanthropic behavior of the parents. Our goal is to determine the importance of the parental role model in the philanthropic behavior of the children.

### Literature Review

Most research on charitable giving considers financial influences such as income, taxes, and government support (Auten et. al. (2002), Brown and Lankford (1992),

Clotfelter (1985), Daneshvary and Luksetich (1997), Feldstein and Clotfelter (1976), Randolph (1995), Reece (1979), Steinberg (1990)). Other papers focus on personal demographics (Andreoni et.al. (2003), Auten and Rudney (1990), and Duncan (1999)). *(Will update and expand with details.)*

More recently, Steinberg and Wilhelm (2004) have estimated the intergenerational transmission of generosity using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and the Center on Philanthropy Panel Study (COPPS) data, which allows the matching of households of adult children with their parents. The data provides information for both family units concerning demographics and philanthropic behavior. They find that the level of parental giving positively influences the level of the adult children's giving. Most recently, Wilhelm, Brown, Rooney and Steinberg combine these data with a model specifying the transmission mechanism of generosity from parents to children. A complete analysis of the econometric issues and the potential bias is reported. Of particular interest is the determination of the appropriate estimation method given the numerous children reporting zero donations and the skewness in the distribution of donations. In addition, the measurement of variables that capture the intergenerational influence of parents may be noisy and by necessity proxied by current behavioral/economic variables. Borrowing from the intergenerational income mobility literature, the authors discuss two sources of bias: attenuation and "life-cycle" bias. Attenuation bias results when current parental giving is substituted for permanent giving, resulting in the underestimation of the effect of parental role-modeling. "Life-cycle" bias is an issue when dealing with younger families and using current giving as a measure of the children's generosity. In addition, bias may result from common unobserved influences on both parents and children, omitted variables in general, and the motivation of parents to act in response to behavior they deem undesirable in their children.

In light of these issues the empirical results indicate a relatively strong impact of role-modeling on the generosity of children, particularly for religious giving. While the secular elasticity between generations is smaller than the religious elasticity, it is in the same range as the intergenerational consumption elasticity. While role-modeling is most effective in influencing religious generosity, it none the less significantly impacts all areas of giving.

Given the substantial foundation laid out by Wilhelm et. al., and using data from the same source, the scope of this paper is much more modest and should be considered at a very preliminary and exploratory stage. The question we address in this paper is by what means parents influence their children's altruistic behavior. Focusing on the parental influence, we assume that children are affected by the socioeconomic position of their parents, the excessive generosity of the parents (defined as the difference between actual and predicted giving based on personal and family characteristics), the volunteer behavior of the parents, the marital stability of the parental family unit, and the religious commitment of the parents.

### The Model

We assume that a family's generosity is influenced by their current socioeconomic status and by the family structure in which they were raised. While we might predict that generous, giving parents will have generous, giving children the question remains as to how that influence occurs. One avenue of transmission lies in the socioeconomic status of the family itself and the influence of their peer group, a second in parental activity that deviates from the norm of their peer group, and a third in the underlying structure of the family unit.

The socioeconomic status of the parents may influence the child's attitude toward charitable behavior by the family's involvement in community affairs and civic engagement. Families and their peers may be involved in similar community activities, attend the same schools, and belong to the same church. They may share common values and a similar willingness to support nonprofit causes. That involvement may generate a similar financial commitment from those of similar socioeconomic status.

While there may be a common attitude of community between those of similar socioeconomic status, there is still a wide variation in the level of altruistic behavior. While children may observe a given level of generosity from their family and friends, parents may exert additional influence beyond that of their peers by individual acts that are above (or below) the norm. Parents that give support above and beyond that of their peers are apt to make an impression on their children. While this may be the case in financial generosity, the parent that gives more willingly of their time is apt to be noticed,

and hopefully imitated, by their children. Likewise, parents who attend meetings but never volunteer of their time or money may be equally influential.

Family structure is also assumed to influence the transmission of values. Children of divorce may have trouble connecting and forming relationships as they become adults. (citations should be included). As such, this may negatively affect their altruistic tendencies. Because religion tends to be a large part of nonprofit giving, families with a strong religious commitment may exert a greater influence on their children than those that claim no religious affiliation.

Given the above discussion, the model to be estimated takes the form:

$$\text{Donations}_{\text{children}} = f \left( \begin{array}{l} \text{Income}_{\text{children}} \\ \text{Demographics}_{\text{children}} \\ \text{Income}_{\text{parents}} \\ (\text{Actual Donations} - \text{Predicted Donations})_{\text{parents}} \\ \text{Volunteer Hours}_{\text{parents}} \\ \text{Religious Commitment}_{\text{parents}} \\ \text{Marital Status}_{\text{parents}} \end{array} \right).$$

### The Data

The data used in this paper come from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) conducted by the University of Michigan’s Institute for Social Research, and the Center on Philanthropy Panel Study (COPPS) at Indiana University – Purdue University Indianapolis. The PSID and COPPS include family level data on economic, demographic, and charitable activity. In addition, individual records are available for family members which allow the tracking of individuals over time as family compositions change. From the individual records for 2001, we identify all individuals who are characterized as the head of household (7406 count). We then trace these heads back to the 1999 survey, and identify those individuals that were children or stepchildren in a 1999 household (315 count). We match the 2001 family records of these 1999 children to the 2001 family records of their parents, the parents and children residing in separate households. Allowing for multiple children, missing adult family matches, and missing observations of matched families, this results in a sample of approximately 248. The sample is further reduced by limiting the number of parental family matches to

families with income records going back to 1994 and wealth records going back to 1984. This allows inclusion of more permanent measures of income and wealth, but does decrease the sample size to approximately 157.

A similar data set is created for those who were children or stepchildren in 1997 and formed their own household in 1999. The 1997 cohort contains 110 observations when matched with parental family units based on permanent income and wealth.

Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the two separate cohorts, the “1997 children” and the “1999 children”. The samples differ in the length of time the “children” have been on their own, but in many respects are very similar. The frequency and amount of giving is very similar, with approximately 40% of each cohort making positive donations, averaging approximately \$690 per year. The average income of the ’97 cohort is significantly higher than the ’99 cohort, \$43 thousand versus \$30 thousand, although the average wealth is slightly lower, \$25 thousand versus \$26 thousand. A higher percent of the ’97 cohort is married with children, compare to the ’99 cohort. Religious affiliation is slightly higher in the ’99 cohort as reported by the head of household.

The most striking difference between the two cohorts lies in the variation between the characteristics of the “givers” and “non-givers” (as it relates to their charitable donations). For both cohorts the “givers” have more education (almost 1 year), and greater income (between \$12 and \$15 thousand). The “givers” have greater wealth, but the difference between the “givers” and “non-givers” is significantly greater for the ’99 cohort than the ’97 cohort, \$33 thousand versus \$7 thousand. While “givers” in both cohorts show a higher tendency for marriage, the difference is 9% for the ’99 cohorts and 5% for the ’97 cohorts. The religious affiliation is near the same within the ’97 cohorts, but 16% higher for the “givers” in the ’99 cohort.

The characteristics of the parents are very similar between the two cohorts. In both cases, the “givers” have a higher instance of having parents who are married, as opposed to single, divorced, widowed. The income and wealth of the parents are clearly higher for the “givers” in both cohorts, as is the level of giving of the parents. The volunteering pattern of the parents is somewhat mixed, particularly for the spouse.

## Empirical Results

The following section provides the empirical results estimating the determinants of giving and the amount given. Given the small sample size and the high proportion of families that report zero donations the results tend to be relatively unstable. As such, various model specifications are estimated to identify those factors that remain significant regardless of variable choice or sample specification. In all models parental income is based on an average of real income from 1994 to 2001. The predicted value of parental giving is based on a model by Hughes and Luksetich (2005) including permanent income and wealth, the variation in income and wealth, and additional control variables.

Tables 2.a, 2.b, and 2.c present the empirical results of the factors that influence the decision to give to nonprofit organizations. The probit model is used to estimate the factors that influence the probability of a family giving to charity. It should be noted that over half of the sample gave less than \$25 to nonprofit organizations, in which case their level of giving is reported as zero. For the '97 cohort, current family income and the generosity of the parents are the two factors which significantly influence the probability of the family supporting nonprofit activity. For the '99 cohort, current family income and the parent's permanent income positively influence the children's probability of giving. In addition, the parental head of household's religious affiliation and volunteering positively influence the children's probability of giving. When the two cohorts are combined, the significance of the children's income remains, but the emphasis shifts to include the children's education and the parent's generosity. The small sample size causes a great deal of variation in the parameter estimates, although a core group of factors tend to remain significant throughout the analysis.

The next set of models, tables 3.a -3.e, uses the Tobit model to estimate the amount of charitable donations made by the adult children. If this particular line of research is determined to be fruitful, we will extend the analysis to an appropriate estimation technique which does not require the residuals to be normally distributed. While the current estimators are inconsistent, they are used here to shed some light on how parental behavior may impact that of their adult children.

Table 3.a presents the Tobit results for the '97 cohort. Similar to the probit model, the main determinants of the amount given by families to charitable activities are

current family income and the generosity of the parents. The income elasticity is relatively high, estimated at 1.68. An increase in current income of 10% is estimated to increase the child's generosity by 16.8%. The elasticity of giving with respect to parental generosity is equal to 0.68 evaluated at the mean level of parental giving. The Tobit coefficients measure the marginal effects on the children's generosity, allowing both positive and negative values of giving.<sup>1</sup> The observed generosity is censored at zero, however. To calculate the marginal effect on the actual value of giving, the Tobit coefficients are multiplied by the probability in the uncensored region of the sample. We approximate this probability with the proportion of uncensored observations in the sample (41%). The marginal elasticity of giving with respect to current income is 0.704, and with respect to parental generosity is 0.286.

Table 3.b presents the results for the '99 cohort. In this case the current income and religious affiliation of the children are significant, and parental influence is transmitted through the head's volunteer efforts and the family's permanent income. The income elasticities for the latent Tobit equation are again relatively high, estimated at 2.06 for current family income and 1.187 for parental permanent income. The marginal impact on observed giving is significantly lower at 0.82 for current income and 0.47 for parental permanent income. The significance of parental volunteering is driven by one extreme observation (2000 hours). When that observation is dropped, table 3.c, volunteering is no longer significant and the remaining coefficients are unchanged.

When the two cohorts are combined, table 3.d, the significance of current income and parental generosity remain, and now the children's education becomes significant. When the model is expanded to include additional control variables, table 3.e, two factors remain significant: current family income and parental generosity. The elasticities for the latent Tobit equation are equal to 1.67 with respect to current family income, and 0.34 with respect to parental generosity. The marginal impact on giving is then equal to 0.68 with respect to current income and 0.138 with respect to parental generosity.

### Conclusion

In this paper we estimate the influence of parents on the generosity of their children. Four factors were highlighted as possible methods of the transmission of

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<sup>1</sup> See Greene pages 909-911.

values: parental income, generosity, volunteering, and religious affiliation. While there does seem to be some influence due to socioeconomic status, a more significant factor is the generosity of parents relative to their peers. Surprisingly, more visible aspects of behavior such as volunteering and religious affiliation do not have a significant impact on the children's charitable behavior.

These results are based on early observations in the life-cycle of family behavior. The families have been independent of their parents for less than four years. They are in the early stages of income, marriage and children, and charitable giving. We would anticipate charitable giving to increase substantially throughout the life cycle. Even at this early stage of giving, the impact that parents exert on their children's behavior is significant. One might expect this influence to increase over time as a more permanent income and giving pattern emerge. While it is possible to track children back in the sample to earlier points of family formation, the current method of construction results in increasing smaller sample sizes, which make the results all the more tenuous.

<b>Table 1 – Descriptive Statistics</b>						
	<b>1997 Kids</b>	<b>Nongivers '97</b>	<b>Givers '97</b>	<b>1999 Kids</b>	<b>Nongivers 99</b>	<b>Givers '99</b>
<b><u>Adult Children</u></b>	110	64	46	157	95	62
Total Giving	\$289		\$690	\$272		\$690
Education	12.68	12.4	13.1	12.7	12.4	13.2
Family Income	\$43,070	\$36,986	\$51,534	\$30,059	\$25,290	\$37,366
Wealth (w/o home equity)	\$16,982	\$14,569	\$20,341	\$20,446	\$8,697	\$38,448
Wealth	\$25,280	\$22,463	\$29,199	\$26,334	\$12,257	\$45,369
Married	30%	28%	33%	20%	16%	27%
Age of Head	26	26	26	25	24	25
Number children	0.60	0.67	0.50	0.41	0.43	0.39
Working	85%	84%	85%	89%	88%	90%
Itemize taxes	17%	9%	28%	10%	6%	15%
No religious affiliation (head)	16%	16%	17%	18%	24%	8%
No religious affiliation (married/spouse)	11%	17%	7%	9%	0%	12.5%
<b><u>Parental Characteristics</u></b>						
Married	74%	71%	79%	77%	73%	83%
Age of Head	53	53	53	52	51	53
Head Volunteering (Omit obs. hours=2000)	32	34	31	47(35)	33(35)	69(36)
Spouse Volunteering	48	44	53	36	42	29
No religious affiliation (head)	1%	2%	0%	8%	9%	5%
No religious affiliation (married/spouse)	2%	2%	3%	1%	1%	0%
Total Income (permanent)	\$65,513	\$58,106	\$75,818	\$56,707	\$47,674	\$70,548
Permanent Wealth	\$125,224	\$95,389	\$166,732	\$144,688	\$126,172	\$173,059
Total Giving	\$1,774	\$1,321	\$2,403	\$2,177	\$1,384	\$3,395

**Table 2.a. 1997 Probit Model**

Dependent Variable: DUMMYKGIVE

Method: ML - Binary Probit (Quadratic hill climbing)

Variable	Coefficient		z-Statistic
<b>Adult Children:</b>			
Education	0.080115		0.922659
LOG(Family Income)	<b>0.345541</b>		<b>1.669432</b>
Wealth	1.33E-06		0.711982
Married (1/0)	-0.189751		-0.612581
Number of children	-0.111065		-0.796822
Working (1/0)	-0.304271		-0.756521
No religion head (1/0)	0.146028		0.369603
<b>Parents:</b>			
No religion head (1/0)	-7.018296		-8.83E-05
No religion wife (1/0)	7.026922		8.84E-05
Head volunteering	-0.000357		-0.402879
Wife volunteering	-0.000411		-0.411481
Permanent Income	-0.073697		-0.567393
Giving (Actual – Pred)	<b>9.22E-05</b>		<b>1.845080</b>
Constant term	-3.663816		-1.877501
Mean dependent var	0.418182	S.D. dependent var	0.495518
		McFadden R-squared	0.114006
Obs with Dep=0	64	Total obs	110
Obs with Dep=1	46		

**Table 2.b. 1999 Probit Model**

Dependent Variable: DUMMYKGIVE

Method: ML - Binary Probit (Quadratic hill climbing)

Variable	Coefficient	z-Statistic	
<b>Adult Children:</b>			
Education	0.129308	1.503443	
LOG(Family Income)	<b>0.392078</b>	<b>2.323690</b>	
Wealth	2.35E-06	1.092075	
Married (1/0)	0.177411	0.547744	
Number of children	0.027803	0.160677	
Working (1/0)	-0.300012	-0.764364	
No religion head (1/0)	<b>-0.901092</b>	<b>-2.365126</b>	
<b>Parents:</b>			
No religion head (1/0)	-0.226903	-0.447977	
No religion wife (1/0)	-8.680234	-3.53E-06	
Head volunteering	<b>0.001605</b>	<b>1.961346</b>	
Wife volunteering	-0.001080	-0.846502	
Permanent Income	<b>0.284973</b>	<b>2.094328</b>	
Giving (Actual – Pred)	2.79E-05	0.854320	
Constant term	-8.596853	-4.239074	
Mean dependent var	0.397436	S.D. dependent var	0.490944
		McFadden R-squared	0.245935
Obs with Dep=0	94	Total obs	156
Obs with Dep=1	62		

**Table 2.c. Probit Model Full Sample**

Dependent Variable: DUMMYKGIVE

Method: ML - Binary Probit (Quadratic hill climbing)

Variable	Coefficient	z-Statistic	
<b>Adult Children:</b>			
Education	<b>0.115418</b>	<b>2.065450</b>	
LOG(Family Income)	<b>0.337436</b>	<b>2.835930</b>	
Wealth	1.43E-06	1.138204	
Married (1/0)	-0.045344	-0.214391	
Number of children	-0.040856	-0.399880	
Working (1/0)	-0.248633	-0.946166	
No religion head (1/0)	-0.261560	-1.083021	
<b>Parents:</b>			
No religion head (1/0)	-0.365223	-0.993651	
No religion wife (1/0)	-0.834100	-1.469826	
Head volunteering	0.000483	1.079416	
Wife volunteering	-0.000768	-1.032610	
Permanent Income	0.109034	1.272555	
Giving (Actual – Pred)	<b>5.88E-05</b>	<b>1.871950</b>	
Constant term	-6.045070	-4.568052	
Mean dependent var	0.406015	S.D. dependent var	0.492013
		McFadden R-squared	0.128274
Obs with Dep=0	158	Total obs	266
Obs with Dep=1	108		

**Table 3.a. 1997 Adult Children**

Dependent Variable: Log(Adult Children Total Charitable Giving)  
 Method: ML - Censored Normal (TOBIT) (Quadratic hill climbing)

	Coefficient	Elasticity Latent/Actual	z-Statistic
<b>Adult Children:</b>			
Education	0.396036		1.007089
LOG(Family Income)	<b>1.683502</b>	<b>1.68 0.704</b>	<b>1.696672</b>
Wealth	7.22E-06		0.874553
Married (1/0)	-0.271668		-0.186225
Number of children	-0.489241		-0.730741
Working (1/0)	-1.285072		-0.694022
No religion head (1/0)	0.510939		0.289920
<b>Parents:</b>			
No religion head (1/0)	-37.25933		-0.000120
No religion wife (1/0)	38.95735		0.000125
Head volunteering	-0.001535		-0.353917
Wife volunteering	-0.001604		-0.336093
Permanent Income	-0.488948		-0.643940
Giving (Actual – Pred)	<b>0.000386</b>	<b>0.68 0.286</b>	<b>1.999054</b>
Married (1/0)	0.695409		0.358094
Constant term	-16.81438		-1.823964
Error Distribution			
R-squared	0.145361	Mean dependent var	2.313510
Adjusted R-squared	0.008982	S.D. dependent var	2.883203
Left censored obs	64	Right censored obs	0
Uncensored obs	46	Total obs	110

**Table 3.b. 1999 Adult Children**

Dependent Variable: Log(Adult Children Total Charitable Giving)  
 Method: ML - Censored Normal (TOBIT) (Quadratic hill climbing)

	Coefficient	Elasticity		z-Statistic
		Latent/Actual		
<b>Adult Children:</b>				
Education	0.474187			1.417048
LOG(Family Income)	<b>2.065161</b>	<b>2.06</b>	<b>0.82</b>	<b>2.863397</b>
Wealth	2.70E-06			0.719436
Married (1/0)	0.748374			0.594658
Number of children	0.226058			0.328245
Working (1/0)	-1.107981			-0.694755
No religion head (1/0)	<b>-4.328850</b>			<b>-2.691894</b>
<b>Parents:</b>				
No religion head (1/0)	-0.271370			-0.130054
No religion wife (1/0)	-40.18444			-1.32E-05
Head volunteering	<b>0.006053</b>			<b>2.561218</b>
Wife volunteering	-0.004500			-0.906967
Permanent Income	<b>1.187302</b>	<b>1.187</b>	<b>0.47</b>	<b>1.899748</b>
Giving (Actual – Pred)	0.000108			1.585216
Married (1/0)	0.760998			0.518826
Constant term	-39.25948			-4.434932
Error Distribution				
R-squared	0.307001	Mean dependent var	2.195524	
Adjusted R-squared	0.232751	S.D. dependent var	2.846386	
Left censored obs	94	Right censored obs	0	
Uncensored obs	62	Total obs	156	

**Table 3.c. 1999 Adult Children** (Extreme Value of parental volunteering excluded  
(hours=2000))

Dependent Variable: Log(Adult Children Total Charitable Giving)  
Method: ML - Censored Normal (TOBIT) (Quadratic hill climbing)

	Coefficient	z-Statistic	
<b>Adult Children:</b>			
Education	0.478953	1.414269	
LOG(Family Income)	<b>2.079202</b>	<b>2.848272</b>	
Wealth	2.72E-06	0.715474	
Married (1/0)	0.748955	0.588531	
Number of children	0.227056	0.325886	
Working (1/0)	-1.117368	-0.692738	
No religion head (1/0)	<b>-4.377555</b>	<b>-2.680712</b>	
<b>Parents:</b>			
No religion head (1/0)	-0.259060	-0.122378	
No religion wife (1/0)	-45.98842	-1.73E-07	
Head volunteering	0.005240	1.059024	
Wife volunteering	-0.004414	-0.884941	
Permanent Income	<b>1.188262</b>	<b>1.876696</b>	
Giving (Actual – Pred)	0.000109	1.580946	
Married (1/0)	0.801115	0.536034	
Constant term	-39.50603	-4.404442	
Error Distribution			
R-squared	0.301094	Mean dependent var	2.177319
Adjusted R-squared	0.225672	S.D. dependent var	2.846486
Left censored obs	94	Right censored obs	0
Uncensored obs	61	Total obs	155

**Table 3.d. Adult Children Full Sample**

Dependent Variable: Log(Adult Children Total Charitable Giving)

Method: ML - Censored Normal (TOBIT) (Quadratic hill climbing)

	Coefficient	z-Statistic	
<b>Adult Children:</b>			
Education	<b>0.519252</b>	<b>2.037507</b>	
LOG(Family Income)	<b>1.724036</b>	<b>3.014837</b>	
Wealth	3.31E-06	0.911413	
Married (1/0)	0.388554	0.402797	
Number of children	-0.104584	-0.215850	
Working (1/0)	-1.161270	-0.950632	
No religion head (1/0)	-1.505928	-1.327640	
<b>Parents:</b>			
No religion head (1/0)	-1.356214	-0.768105	
No religion wife (1/0)	-4.100008	-1.486571	
Head volunteering	0.002728	1.326881	
Wife volunteering	-0.003050	-0.891518	
Permanent Income	0.537613	1.138541	
Giving (Actual – Pred)	<b>0.000166</b>	<b>2.388031</b>	
Married (1/0)	0.377759	0.320989	
Constant term	-29.58829	-4.589739	
Error Distribution			
R-squared	0.176571	Mean dependent var	2.244315
Adjusted R-squared	0.127166	S.D. dependent var	2.856833
Left censored obs	158	Right censored obs	0
Uncensored obs	108	Total obs	266

**Table 3.e. Full Sample – Additional Control Variables**

Dependent Variable: Log(Adult Children Total Charitable Giving)

Method: ML - Censored Normal (TOBIT) (Quadratic hill climbing)

	Coefficient	Elasticity Latent/Actual		z-Statistic
<b>Adult Children:</b>				
Education	0.459527			1.554440
LOG(Family Income)	<b>1.673164</b>	<b>1.67</b>	<b>0.68</b>	<b>2.820752</b>
Wealth	3.21E-06			0.881164
Married (1/0)	0.385722			0.367034
Age head	0.309699			0.511880
Age head - squared	-0.005043			-0.523073
Female head (1/0)	-0.115645			-0.119726
White (1/0)	-0.370809			-0.364646
Big City (1/0)	0.418648			0.381945
Number of children	-0.188590			-0.371519
Working (1/0)	-1.150436			-0.929680
No religion head (1/0)	-1.531813			-1.339895
<b>Parents:</b>				
No religion head (1/0)	-1.328552			-0.748974
No religion wife (1/0)	-4.113958			-1.480465
Head volunteering	0.002553			1.219610
Wife volunteering	-0.003040			-0.887285
Permanent Income	0.525097			1.033526
Giving (Actual – Pred)	<b>0.000170</b>	<b>0.34</b>	<b>0.138</b>	<b>2.415985</b>
Married (1/0)	0.350570			0.294953
Constant term	-32.53908			-3.393874
Error Distribution				
R-squared	0.176038	Mean dependent var	2.244315	
Adjusted R-squared	0.108775	S.D. dependent var	2.856833	
Left censored obs	158	Right censored obs	0	
Uncensored obs	108	Total obs	266	

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